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Science and Implementation
Mary Ruckelshaus and Donna Darm

The U.S. Endangered Species Act (ESA) relies heavily on science, and not surprisingly science has become a major battleground in the controversy surrounding its implementation (Doremus, this volume). Apparently, Congress hoped
that ESA decisions could be made based on science alone and thereby insulated
from politics (U.S. Congress 1982, 19). This hope was unrealistic for at least
two reasons. First, science cannot answer with certainty many of the questions
that must be answered in ESA decision making, especially in the time frames
demanded by the statute. Second, while science has a central role in informing
natural resource decisions, scientific information alone cannot "make decisions." Criticizing the science seems to be one outcome of hard policy choices
(Mapes 2001; Boyle 2002; Dalton 2002; Seattle Times 2002; Stokstad 2002;
Strassel 2002; Pianin 2003; Sacramento Bee 2003a and 2003b; Cart and Weiss
2004).
The ESA requires agency reliance on science in several areas: The secretaries
of commerce and the interior must designate critical habitat based on the best
available scientific data (ESA sec. 4(b)(2)); federal agencies must rely on the best
available scientific and commercial data but ensure that their actions will not
jeopardize the continued existence of listed species or adversely modifY their
critical habitat (ESA sec. 7(a)(2)); and recovery plans must adopt objective criteria for delisting (ESA sec. 4(f)(1)(B)(ii)). In requiring that decisions affecting
endangered species be made primarily on the basis of science, Congress sought
to insulate agencies from political pressure. Instead, perversely, intense political
pressure has forced underground the agency policy choices inherent in sciencebased decisions (Doremus 1997).
Some scholars have argued that "better science" will not reduce the controversy surrounding the act. Instead, they call for more openness about the policy
choices embedded in ESA decisions (Doremus 1997; Myer 2001; Yaffee 2006).
The authors wholeheartedly agree, but we also believe that better scientific information and processes of eliciting and translating science can improve decision making under the act.
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The ESA has been the subject of intense debate in the scientific literature in
terms of its effectiveness in protecting species (Schwartz 1999; Boersma et al.
20 0 1; Crouse et al. 2002; Scott et al. 2006, chap. 2). Federal agency use of scientific information in implementing the act was evaluated by the National Research Council (1995). In this chapter, we focus on the role of science in the act
and how the agencies use science in practice. We address the following questions for each stage of the ESA process from listing through recovery planning:
(1) What is the role of science, and what has agency practice revealed to be the
difficulties of incorporating science? (2) How have the public and courts responded? (3) How could either the science or the process of providing science
be improved? We also consider whether decision makers are prepared to make
and explain decisions based on incomplete science. We close with suggestions
for how scientists can better serve decision making under the act.

The Science Underlying Listing Determinations
Two biological questions are central to the listing process: What is the species
(or biological unit) to be listed? And what is the species' likely risk of extinction?
The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) and National Marine Fisheries
Service (NMFS) have developed interagency guidance on how to manage listing petitions (USFWS and NMFS 1996d, 1999d) but that guidance does not
offer biological criteria to address the issues below.

What is a Listable Unit?
The Endangered Species Act protects "subspecies and any distinct population
segment of any species of vertebrate fish or wildlife which interbreeds when mature" (sec. 3(15)). Four difficult science issues have emerged in practice: Do all
subspecies have equivalent "significance" taxonomically? What is a distinct population segment (Waples, this volume)? How does hybridization between taxa
affect species identification (Haig and Allendorf, this volume)? How should artificially propagated individuals be considered?
SPECIES AND SUBSPECIES

The accuracy and degree of revisions of taxonomic classifications at the subspecies level vary greatly among species. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service has
frequently encountered situations in which it was uncertain whether a group of
individuals should be classified as a distinct population segment, a subspecies,
or even a separate species (e.g., interior least tern [USFWS 1985], lower Keys
rice rat [USFWS 1991a], Mississippi gopher frog [Rana capito sevosa] , California red-legged frog [Rana aurora dray to nit] [USFWS 1996a], and California

106

PART

II.

CONSERVATION SCIENCE

tiger salamander [Ambystoma californiensel [USFWS 2003c]). The listing deter_
minations for the coastal California gnatcatcher (Polioptila californica califor_
nica) (USFWS 1993), dusky seaside sparrow (Ammodramus maritimus nigrescens) (Avise and Nelson 1989), and Florida panther (Puma concolor coryz)
(Culver et al. 2000) aroused enormous controversy over the issue of whether the
groups were significantly divergent from more common sister taxa to be consid_
ered subspecies and therefore listable units. The social and political fallout frorn
these listing decisions continues today (e.g., Carlson 2003; Miami Herald2003.,
PFeifer 2003; Wilson 2003a). In some respects the controversy is misplaced because even if not considered subspecies, many of these population groups can be
listed as distinct population segments (Stanford Environmental Law Society
2001). In other cases, new information about the lack of reproductive isolation
may lead USFWS and NMFS biologists to conclude that a group of populations is neither a subspecies (contrary to a published classification) nor a distinct
population segment, as in the case of the western sage grouse (USFWS 2004a).
DISTINCT POPULATION SEGMENT

The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and National Marine Fisheries Service have
a joint distinct population segment (DPS) policy (USFWS and NMFS 1996e)
that provides two tests of distinctness: (1) Is the population or group of populations markedly separate from other populations of the same species? (2) Is it significant? NMFS adopted a policy for designating distinct population segments
of Pacific salmon and steelhead (NMFS 1991; Waples 1991, 1995), which relies on identification of evolutionarily significant units (ESUs) before the joint
DPS policy was implemented (Waples, this volume). In delineating a DPS,
agencies must establish the significance of intraspecific variation in life history,
genetic, or morphological traits. It is important to determine the relationship of
life history variants (e.g., races) to one another in order to decide into how
many pieces a species could or should be divided for listing determinations
(Waples, this volume).
The coastal California gnatcatcher illustrates the difficulty in determining
the significance of within-species variation. The birds were originally identified
as a subspecies based on bill size and shape, tail length, and overall colorationall characteristics used by ornithologists to establish taxonomic classifications
(USFWS 1993). These characteristics evolved since the last ice age, when the
birds expanded northward from a refuge in Mexico-evolutionarily a very short
time frame. Skeptical of the listing, private-sector interests sponsored research
suggesting morphological variations may not be genetically based. In response,
the USFWS proposed listing the coastal California gnatcatcher as a distinct
population segment (USFWS 2003a). As a practical matter, in spite of a rash of
new scientific information gathering and analyses, the listing of the gnatcatcher
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as a DrS rather than a subspecies has had little, if any, effect on the degree of
protection it is afforded under the Endangered Species Act.
How important is intraspecific variation to long-term persistence of the subspecies or species? Should relatively recently evolved forms be protected? Some
observers (and plaintiffs) argue that the act is meant to protect morphologically
unique forms as "distinct" population segments (Doremus 1997). Others sugaest that the relevant inquiry should be whether, if lost, the variation could
~volve again in a time span meaningful to humans (such as a few generations)
(Ruckelshaus et al. 2002b; Waples et al. 2004).
Once a distinct population segment is delineated, scientists must assess the
importance of different morphological or life history forms to the continued existence of the Drs (or species or subspecies) as a whole.
HYBRIDS

Hybridization between closely related taxa can create listing challenges, especially when one of the hybridizing species is common and the other rare (Haig
and Allendorf, this volume). For example, the red wolf (Canis lupus rufus),
which is listed as endangered under the ESA, may interbreed with the unlisted
eastern gray wolf ( Canis lupus lycaon) (Wayne and Jenks 1991; Dowling et al.
1992; Nowak 1992; Brownlow 1996). An equally vexing example is the westslope cutthroat trout (Oncorhynchus clarki lewisz), which hybridizes with introduced rainbow trout (0. mykiss) in the western United States (Allendorf and
Leary 1988; Behnke 1992; Rubidge et al. 2001; Rubidge 2003; Taylor et al.
2003). In that case, after legal challenge and extensive discussion, the U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service decided not to list the trout despite a proposed policy on
considering hybrids (or intercrosses) under the act (USFWS and NMFS 1996£;
USFWS 2003f).
ARTIFICIAL PROPAGATION

Both the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service have had to consider artificially propagated individuals occurring in natural
habitats (e.g., fish produced in a hatchery, captively bred birds). Until recently,
both agencies judged the danger of extinction and the state of recovery based on
naturally reproducing populations. NMFS has proposed a policy that considers
the risk of extinction of species based on the combined artificially propagated
and naturally produced components of populations (NMFS 2004a, 2005a).
The proposal raises interesting policy and science questions. The policy side
must address the acceptable degree of risk, both with respect to biological issues
(such as likelihood of persistence) and management issues (such as the likelihood of continued funding for artificial propagation programs). On the science
side, biologists must incorporate artificial propagation into extinction risk
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models despite poor data on breeding patterns, reproductive success, and move_
ment of hatchery and wild fish. At the interface berween science and policy,
there is the question of the importance of a species' "evolutionary trajectory." Is
a distinct population segment in danger of diverging from a natural evolution_
ary trajectory because of artificial selection also "in danger of extinction? Presumably it could be if the artificial selection makes it likely the distinct population segment will no longer be significant to the taxon (or evolutionarily
significant, in the case of an evolutionarily significant unit; Myers et al. 2004).
PUBLIC AND COURT REACTION

Courts are generally unwilling to second-guess agency biologists when it comes
to taxonomic classification or evaluation of extinction risk. The General Accounting Office reviewed sixty-four listing decisions by the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service berween 1999 and 2002 and found that peer reviewers "overwhelmingly supported" the science behind the decisions. Courts overturned
only rwo listing decisions because of improper use of scientific data (GAO
2003). However, courts will intervene when judges believe the National Marine
Fisheries Service or U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service have failed to follow the
statute, regulations, or policies, or when the judge believes the agencies have
failed to adequately explain the connection berween the data and the conclusion. For example, a district court invalidated NMFS's decision to list naturally
spawned but not hatchery-spawned Oregon coast coho salmon, even though
the agency found them to comprise a single evolutionarily significant unit
(Alsea Valley Alliance v. Evans 2001). A court of appeals threw out the USFWS's
decision to list a population of the cactus ferruginous pygmy-owl (Glaucidium
brasilianum cactorum) because the agency failed to explain how the population
was "significant" and therefore a distinct population segment under the joint
DPS policy (National Association ofHome Builders v. Norton 2003). And a district court concluded that NMFS did not use the best available science when it
relied on an outdated taxonomic classification for the killer whale ( Orcinus orca)
( Center for Biological Diversity v. Lohn 2003).
ADVANCING THE ROLE OF SCIENCE

The NRC review of use of science in the Endangered Species Act was supportive of the "evolutionary unit" concept (National Research Council 1995).
Much of the ongoing scientific debate over DPS/ESU identification involves
technical points, such as how best to describe evolutionarily significant variation for protection (summarized in Ruckelshaus et al. 2002b; Waples, this volume). Some observers feel the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and National Marine Fisheries Service have defined distinct population segments too narrowly
(Doremus 1997), arguing that the Endangered Species Act was intended to pro-
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tect populations that have aesthetic value, are keystone species within their
ecosystems, or are in some other sense unique. The concern is that the rigid "scientific" approach embodied in ESU and DPS policies ignores other equally
valid values that Congress intended to protect. The policies in most cases provide workable guidance in determining whether a species exists for purposes of
the act.

Extinction Risk
Once the listable unit (i.e., species, subspecies, or distinct population segment)
is identified, its risk of extinction must be estimated under section 4(a) of the
Endangered Species Act (table 10.1). The act defines an "endangered species" to
be "in danger of extinction throughout all or a signficant portion of its range"
(sec. 3(6)) and a "threatened species" to be "likely to become an endangered
species within the foreseeable future" (sec. 3(19)).
THE ROLE OF SCIENCE IN AGENCY PRACTICE

Risk evaluations are necessarily a combination of scientific analyses and policy
judgments about the degree of "acceptable" risk and the time frames over which
risk should be evaluated (Burgman 2005). Decision makers must then interject
a judgment about whether a species' risk of extinction triggers the statutory definitions of "endangered" or "threatened."
Qualitative approaches to estimating species risk, if transparent and systematic, can be as reliable as quantitative approaches (e.g., Keith et ai. 2004; McCarthy et ai. 2004). Neither the u.S. Fish and Wildlife Service nor the National
Marine Fisheries Service regularly use widely accepted qualitative approaches to
estimating extinction risk OUCN 1994; NatureServe 2003). NMFS implemented its own risk evaluation matrix to assess the status of over fifty ESUs of
Pacific salmonids (Wainwright and Kope 1999). This matrix accounted for diversity and spatial distribution in addition to conventional population status
analysis (e.g., Allendorf et ai. 1997; Shelden et ai. 2001).
Quantitative extinction risk models (known collectively as population viability analyses, or PYAs) require information on population size, population
growth rate, and variability in population growth rate over time (Dennis et ai.
1991; Boyce 1992; Morris et ai. 1999). The critical first step of identifying demographically independent populations is almost never done in PYAs despite
evidence that ignoring population structure can cause grave errors in estimates
of extinction risk (Morris et ai. 1999). In a recent counterexample, NMFS identified independent populations before conducting viability modeling for Pacific
salmonids (McElhany et ai. 2000; Ruckelshaus et ai. 2002a).
The data needed to parameterize even the simplest PYA models are almost
always incomplete (Reed et aI., this volume). Additional uncertainties arise with
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Key science-related provisions within the Endangered Species Act

ESA provision
4(a) Listing

11.

Science-related
question addressed
by provision

Further work
needed on analyses
pertaining to
provision

Further work
needed On
application oj
provision

---------

Is there a "species"?

Improved definition
Agency guidance On
--------------of the "distinct
how to address h
population segbridization, defi~:
ment! evol utionarily
tion of taxonomie
significant unit"
"significance," and
concept
artificially propa_
gated individuals
Improved definition
What is the species'
4(a) Listing
Agency guidance on
risk of extinction?
of time scales, atconsideration of el(.
tention to multiple
tinction risk and
indicators of risk,
"significant portion"
methods of estimatof range
ing rates of reproduction of at-risk
speCles
4(b) Critical habitat What habitat features Relationship berween Agency guidance on
are essential to
designation
habitat quality!
designating critical
species' conservaquantityand
habitat, how to
tion and how much
species extinction
weigh benefits!costs;
risk
habitat is needed
consider sequence of
for conservation?
application
7(a)(2) Federal
What effect will a par- Relative importance
More-open science
ticular action have
consultation
of different limiting
process in section 7
lO(a)(l)(B) Habitat
factors in extinction
on species' survival
consultations; guidrisk; how effects of
or recovery?
conservation
ance on considering
Does an action result
plans
piecemeal vs. whole
individual actions
in take, and if so,
relate to whole poplife-cyde approach
how much?*
ulation! species
impacts
More public participa4(f) Recovery
What are the charac- All of the above
tion in policy overteristics of a recovplanning
sight of the planning
ered species?
What factors are limprocess
iting recovery?
What habitat is essential to recovery?
* This question also arises in section 9 enforcement actions, which are not addressed in this chapter.
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model structure-for example, how to depict population responses at small
sizes, the effects of density-dependent population regulation, and choice of a
quasi-extinction threshold (Morris et al. 1999). For these reasons it is important
[0 explore the sensitivity ofPVA results to alternative assumptions (e.g., Dennis
et at. 1991; Holmes 2001; Holmes and Fagan 2002), as NMFS has done for
estimating the status of Pacific salmon and Steller sea-lions (Eumetopias jubatUll in listing and recovery decisions (Gerber and VanBlaricom 2001; NMFS
2003a; Puget Sound Technical Recovery Team 2002; Willamette-Lower Columbia Technical Recovery Team 2003).
Applications of PVA generally assume that past trends and variability in input parameters can be used to project future population dynamics. This is almost certainly an incorrect assumption given climate change, changes in human management of the landscape, introduction and spread of nonindigenous
species, and changing rates and intensity of human-influenced catastrophes
(e.g., fire, toxic, or oil spills). A promising approach is to use scenario planning
whereby scientists ask whether an estimated risk of extinction (or any population outcome) changes under alternative views of future conditions (see "The
Science Underlying Recovery Planning" in this chapter; Clark et al. 2001; Carpenter 2002; Peterson et al. 2003).
An emerging issue for the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and National Marine Fisheries Service is interpretation of the statutory definition of an endangered species as one that is in danger of extinction "throughout all or a significant portion of its range" (emphasis added). Recent practice has been to rely on
the identification of a distinct population segment. Dissatisfied with some determinations not to list, plaintiffs have begun ro challenge the agencies for failure to separately examine whether a species, subspecies, or DPS is in danger of
extinction in at least a portion of its range (Deftnders of Wildlife v. Norton 2001,
2002; Environmental Protection Information Center [EPIC) v. National Marine
Fisheries Service [NMFS} 2004.) While the two agencies have not yet explicitly
interpreted this statutory phrase, recent USFWS decisions have applied a biological test, similar to the significance test of the DPS policy, examining
whether a population group is biologically significant even though it is not discrete (e.g., USFWS 1998,2000). It is unclear whether the two agencies believe
that a species in danger of extinction in only a portion of its range must be listed
throughout its entire range (see Marbled Murrelet v. Lujan 1992).
PUBLIC AND COURT REACTION

Doremus (1997) suggested that the public reacts negatively to unbridled agency
discretion in identifying species and determining risk of extinction. However,
it seems this reaction is less about whether the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
and National Marine Fisheries Service have misapplied science than it is an
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objection to protecting such creatures as rats and bugs, often against private interests. Courts tend to defer to agency listing determinations (GAO 2003), except when they conclude that the agencies failed to follow the statute or agency
regulations. Although public comment on listing proposals often contests the
agencies' analysis of extinction risk, the authors are unaware of any Successful
court challenges in that area.
ADVANCING THE ROLE OF SCIENCE

The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and National Marine Fisheries Service recently outlined criteria by which they will evaluate the effects of federal, state,
and local conservation efforts when making listing decisions (USFWS and
NMFS 2003b). These so-called "conservation measures" have been or soon will
be implemented, although it is still too soon to evaluate their effects on extinction risk. The question is a scientific one that can be exceedingly challenging to
address (see discussion in "The Science Underlying Recovery Planning" below).
The two agencies would be well served by adopting recommendations acknowledging that making listing determinations is not just a science exercise
but has three important policy components: (1) the time period over which persistence should be measured, (2) the level of risk that results in a threatened or
endangered finding, and (3) the burden of proof for demonstrating the effects
of conservation measures. Such recommendations must be flexible enough to
account for the inaccuracy of extinction risk estimates and for biological differences among species. For example, the time period over which extinction is
considered may depend upon the inherent variability in demographic characteristics of a species or the ability of scientists to forecast long-term trends. Recommendations would need to leave room for decision makers and scientists to
work together to understand the biological implications of alternative risk levels
(e.g., modelers can illuminate for decision makers what a 0.99, 0.95, or 0.80
probability of extinction looks like) (Doremus, this volume).
Research is needed on how best to make population or species demographic
parameter estimates from spotty census information (Reed et aI., this volume).
Abundance information for many species of conservation concern consists of
presence/absence data, index counts, or censuses during a specific life stage that
are easy to count, such as breeding aggregations. Making a determination about
the viability status of a species requires that these sample data be translated into
whole population or species counts. What are the best methods for making that
translation? What are the advantages and pitfalls associated with different approaches to estimating species numbers from population subsamples?
Finally, accounting for environmental factors and species interactions that
accelerate or mitigate downward population trends could significantly improve

Chapter 10. Science and Implementation

II3

quantitative models of extinction risk (see also "The Science Underlying Recovery Planning" below; National Research Council 1995).

The Science Underlying Critical Habitat Designations
Within one year oflisting, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and National Marine Fisheries Service must designate critical habitat to the maximum extent
prudent and determinable (table 10.1). The Endangered Species Act defines
critical habitat as "the specific areas within the geographical area occupied by
the species ... on which are found those physical or biological features ... essential to the conservation of the species," and "specific areas outside the geographical area occupied by the species ... upon a determination by the Secretary that such areas are essential for the conservation of the species" (USFWS
and NMFS 199ge, 31872). From this construction, the statute seems to contemplate an approach to critical habitat designation that favors occupied areas:
the agencies first identifY habitat elements essential to species conservation (for
example, a particular type of tree for nesting, vegetation for forage or cover,
gravel streambeds for spawning, etc.) and then designate areas within the
species' present range where those elements are present. Only for areas outside
the species' present range must there be a determination that the area itself is
"essential for conservation." In practice, the agencies, plaintiffs, and some
courts have blurred the two standards and require that all areas, occupied or
unoccupied, meet the test for unoccupied habitat: the area itself must be essential for conservation. For example, in a case involving the Rio Grande silvery
minnow (Hybognathus amarus), the court stated that critical habitat "must be
limited geographically to what is essential to the conservation of the threatened
or endangered species" (Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District v. Babbitt
2000). And in a case involving the Alameda whipsnake (Masticophis lateralis euryxanthus) the court observed that "critical habitat for occupied land is defined
in part ... as specific areas 'essential to the conservation of the species'" (Home
Builders Association of Northern California v. US. Fish and Wildlifi Service
2003).
The USFWS and NMFS have long maintained that critical habitat designation adds little to species protection (Clark 1999). Section 7 of the ESA requires
federal agencies to ensure that their actions do not jeopardize species' continued
existence and do not destroy or adversely modifY their critical habitat. The two
agencies have usually treated an action that adversely modifies critical habitat as
also jeopardizing the species' continued existence, making the prohibition
against adverse modification redundant. Agency regulations defining both jeopardy and adverse modification in similar terms (actions affecting "both the
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survival and recovery" of the species) have reinforced this approach. Critics
point out that critical habitat designation is especially important for species
protection in unoccupied habitat, where the USFWS and NMFS may be less
likely to reach a jeopardy finding (Taylor et al. 2003, 2005). Two separate reviews
examined effects of critical habitat designations on reported trends in species
abundance and content of recovery plans, and the results were mixed (Clark et al.
2002; Hoekstra et al. 2002b; Taylor et al. 2003, 2005). Recent court decisions
have invalidated the agencies' regulatory definition of adverse modification as
not being sufficiently tied to conservation (Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. U.S.
Fish and Wildlifi Service 2004; Sierra Club v.
Fish and Wildlifi Service
2001). As future section 7 practice adjusts to the new legal rulings, the two tests
may prove not to be redundant and the designation of critical habitat may indeed provide increased protection for listed species. The authors believe the current landscape is too unsettled to draw a reliable conclusion from past practice.
Critical habitat designations, where they have been made, have lacked
meaningful analysis of the economic impact (see New Mexico Cattle Growers Association v. US. Fish and Wildlifi Service 2001). Successful court challenges to
designations (or lack of designations) have led to multiple requirements for the
USFWS to designate habitat in very short time frames. Moreover, courts have
ordered the agencies to consider economic impacts of designation, even if they
are "coextensive" with the impacts of applying the section 7 jeopardy requirement (New Mexico Cattle Growers Association v. US. Fish and Wildlifi Service
2001). This requirement is contrary to the best available science regarding economic analysis, which would require an estimate of the costs of designation
based on a comparison of the world with and without the designation (Office of
Management and Budget 2003).
In response, the u.S. Fish and Wildlife Service has vigorously objected to
the requirement (e.g., testimony of Assistant Secretary of the Interior Craig
Manson, [Manson 2003]). Past congressional efforts have failed to amend the
ESA to change the timing of critical habitat designation to coincide with recovery planning instead of listing, but it remains a topic of congressional interest.

us.

The Role ofScience in Agency Practice
Section 4(b)(2) of the Endangered Species Act requires critical habitat designation to be based on the best scientific data available, although the U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service and National Marine Fisheries Service may exclude areas
from designation if economic or other relevant impacts outweigh the benefits
of designation. However, often agencies know little about species' habitat
needs at the time of listing and thus identification of critical habitat is highly
uncertain.
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The agenCIes Jomt designation of critical habitat for the Gulf sturgeon
(Actpenser oxyrinchus desotoi) illustrates this. The two agencies examined the
population structure and concluded that the seven extant populations were
largely reproductively isolated. They reasoned that the populations at the extremes of the range are important for conserving genetic diversity and that the
intermediate populations are important for connectivity, and concluded that all
habitat currently occupied by the seven populations is essential for conservation
(USFWS 2003i). Like the judgments made in analyzing extinction risk, these
were clearly not made in a policy vacuum. The question of how many populations are needed for conservation and how much habitat each needs for conservation are not just scientific questions. The answers depend upon tolerance to
risk and time scales over which the risk is considered.
One of the more contentious debates surrounding critical habitat designation concerns the consideration of economic costs of designation by the U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service and National Marine Fisheries Service and their discretion under section 4(b)(2) of the ESA to exclude areas from designation if
the benefit of exclusion outweighs the benefit of designation. The two agencies
have only recently begun to apply economic analysis in their designations, and
their use of the science of economics is not well developed. Their past practice
of collapsing the jeopardy and adverse modification requirements into a single
test has complicated the economic analysis. Furthermore, at the time of listing,
information is lacking on land use patterns and how economic activities would
be modified as a result of section 7 consultations.

Public and Court Reaction
Provisions in the Endangered Species Act for critical habitat designations have
proven a major flash point for both advocates and critics of species protection
(e.g., Sacramento Bee 2003b; Wilson 2003b; Cart and Weiss 2004). For advocates, the provisions give them their strongest tool for protecting habitat. For
critics, the provisions are among the few places in the statute where economics
comes into play, making them a rallying point for the development-regulated
community. Further, many landowners assume that when private land is designated as critical habitat the federal government is in effect "taking" their property and will restrict its use. And, finally, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and
the National Marine Fisheries Service, arguing that critical habitat designation
adds nothing to species protection, have resisted designating habitat altogether
or have simply designated habitat without sufficient analysis (Patlis 2001). It is
not surprising, therefore, that the agencies often fail to make critical habitat designations and when they do, the designations frequently end up in court (GAO
2003).
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The courts have responded to such treatment with impatience, chastising
agency reluctance to designate critical habitat and ordering that designations be
completed expeditiously. Further complicating the situation are court decisions
finding the agencies' regulatory definition of adverse modification invalid. The
lack of guidance by the two agencies and a growing number of court opinions
make the situation still more uncertain.

Advancing the Role o/Science
There are promising biological approaches that could be used to at least partially address the question of how much occupied and unoccupied habitat is
needed for species persistence (Hanski 1999), but the data requirements are
daunting. For instance, population matrix models can be used to address the
question of how changes in survival at particular life stages affect overall population dynamics or persistence (Caswell 2001). One example of such an application with a listed species is the endangered Kemp's ridley sea turtle (Lepidochelys kempii), in which matrix models suggest that the survival of subadults
and adults in the ocean was most critical to overall population status (Heppell et
al. 1996; Heppell and Crowder 1998). Another approach is to predict how
changes in habitat will impact species status based on empirical habitat suitability models (e.g., Jenkins et al. 2003). Unfortunately, we have limited ability to
directly address the question of critical habitat-what habitat conditions or
amounts significantly affect life-stage-specific survivals?
The science of economics also could contribute to improving the designation process. Section 4(b)(2) of the Endangered Species Act requires the U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service and National Marine Fisheries Service to consider the
impacts of designation and balance the benefits of exclusion against the benefits
of designation. Federal guidelines recommend putting the two types of benefits
into the same metric in a cost-benefit framework (Office of Management and
Budget 2003). Although information may be readily available that allows economic impacts to be quantified and monetized, quantifYing the benefits to
species from critical habitat designation is more difficult.
Thus, best economics practice would have the agencies measure the incremental impact and benefit of designation; the courts, however, have ruled otherwise (New Mexico Cattle Growers Association v. US. Fish and Wildlife Service
2001). How should the agencies proceed in this situation? Best economic practice would have them conduct a formal cost-benefit analysis, yet the short statutory time frames, limited information and resources, and considerable latitude
for discretion suggest formal cost-benefit analysis may be neither possible nor
necessary. One observer has suggested that approaches other than cost-benefit
analysis, such as a cost-effectiveness framework, may be more appropriate (Sin-
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den 2004). This recommendation is consistent with Office of Budget and Management guidance in cases where benefits are difficult to monetize (such as benefits to health or the environment).
The National Research Council recommended identification of habitat critical to survival at time oflisting and designating the rest of critical habitat at the
time of recovery planning (National Research Council 1995). These changes
would require legislative reform of the act, but tying critical habitat designation
to recovery planning has many proponents. The Department of the Interior has
gone on record supporting such a connection (Manson 2004). The General Accounting Office recommends that the USFWS and NMFS adopt guidance on
critical habitat designation (GAO 2003).
Until the agencies amend the regulatory definition of adverse modification,
it will be unclear what standard they are applying in their section 7 consultations and whether they continue to view the prohibitions against jeopardy and
adverse modification of critical habitat as providing redundant protection.
Guidance on the economic analysis called for in the act would also help the
USFWS and NMFS expedite designations. In particular, criteria for determining whether consideration of economic or other relevant impacts outweigh the
benefits of designation would be helpful.

The Science Underlying Limitations on Federal Actions
When a federal agency intends an action that may affect a listed species, it
must consult with the listing agency (table 10.1). For actions that adversely affect the species, the agency provides its biological opinion as to whether the action as proposed is likely to jeopardize the continued existence of a listed
species or adversely modifY its critical habitat. If the agency's opinion is that
the action is likely to cause jeopardy or adverse modification, it must offer a
reasonable and prudent alternative. The statute requires that all agencies "shall
use the best scientific and commercial data available" in fulfilling the consultation requirement.
Analysis of jeopardy and adverse modification is one of the most common
tasks required of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and National Marine Fisheries Service yet one in which the standards are most obscure (Rohlf 1989,
2001). The statute does not define jeopardy or adverse modification. The two
agencies have adopted regulatory definitions of these terms (USFWS and
NMFS 199ge), but their consultation handbook lays out an analytical approach that does not track the regulatory definitions. The regulations define
"jeopardize the continued existence of" to mean "to engage in an action that
reasonably would be expected, directly or indirectly, to reduce appreciably the
likelihood of both the survival and recovery of a listed species in the wild by
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reducing the reproduction, numbers, or distribution of that species" (USFWS
and NMFS 199ge, 31872). Adverse modification is defined as an alteration
that "appreciably diminishes the value of critical habitat for both the survival
and recovery of a listed species." By these definitions the agencies need to compare the likelihood of a species survival and recovery with and without the proposed action to establish jeopardy, and to compare the value of critical habitat
with and without the proposed action to establish adverse modification.
In practice, however, the agencies seldom take that approach, and their consultation handbook lays out a different chain oflogic. The handbook directs the
agencies to consider the status of the species, the environmental baseline, the effects of the action, and cumulative effects to determine whether the species is
likely to survive and recover (USFWS and NMFS 199ge). It does not say what
the agencies should do after summing up those factors. If the species is not expected to survive and recover, how much must the action under consultation
contribute to that failure before it is considered jeopardy? Or, less likely, if the
species is expected to survive and recover, does it matter how much modification occurs to the species' remaining habitat? Analysis of adverse modification
of critical habitat is further complicated by two circuit courts invalidating the
regulatory definition, as discussed previously.
In addition to offering opinions on jeopardy and adverse modification, the
USFWS and NMFS must issue an incidental take statement authorizing a given
level of take associated with the proposed action. Where the action involves
habitat modification (for example, a grazing allotment), the agencies must determine what level of take will be associated with the habitat modification. Although such a determination must be made based on scientific analyses, it is
very difficult for scientists to quantifY a species' response to habitat alterations,
especially smaller-scale changes in habitat.
This is an area in particular where science is inadequate to answer the questions asked. Agencies often lack information to predict the effect an action is
likely to have on a listed species. Furthermore, risks are generally cumulative
and assessing the effect of each individual action on species status is exceedingly
difficult. Finally, threats come from many different actions in different sectors,
forcing the agencies to make a choice about how much of the conservation burden should fall on a given sector (box 10.1).

The Role ofScience in Agency Practice
The variety of agency action considered in section 7 consultations is extremely
diverse, as are the species affected. We offer a few examples in box 10.1 to draw
lessons from agency practice.
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BOX 10.1 Exampies demonstrating the role of science in impIementing section 7 Iimitations on federal actions under the Endangered Species Act
Example 1: Addressing Scientific Uncertainty
The manner in wh ich inevitable scientific uncertainty is incorporated into section 7
consultations is key to using seience to inform sound decisions. In the high-profile
case of Bureau of Reclamation operations on the Klamath River Basin water management project, the National Research Council was brought in to help resolve
what many characterized as a scientinc dispute (Cooperman and Markle 2003).
The NRC's final report (National Research Council 2004a) highlights several recommendations aimed at reducing the uncertainty in the biological conclusions by
the the two agencies that the Bureau's proposed actions will not jeopardize the listed
species. Recommendations include the following: (1) the V.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service are urged to complete recovery
plans for the two species that should identify how research and monitoring will support species recovery and facilitate identification of what actions are allowed under
section 7 and 10 consultations, (2) scientists should be allowed sufficient time to
publish key research findings in peer-reviewed scientific journals, (3) a diverse team
of "cooperators" should be convened for designing ecosystem-based management
actions that have local support for implementation, and (4) experiments should be
conducted to test the effectiveness and feasibility of speeific remediation strategies
(National Research Council2002b, 2004a).
In another example, NMFS was thwarted in an attempt to deal with uncertainties associated with future allocation of necessary conservation actions among sectors in the Columbia River Basin, home to twelve species of endangered salmon and
steelhead whose migrations are affected by operation of the power system. In 2000,
NMFS issued a biological opinion on operation of the Federal Columbia River
Power System (NMFS 2000a). Ta explain how it allocated the conservation burden,
NMFS and the other federal agencies involved presented a conceptual recovery plan
(NMFS 2000b) describing the necessary assumptions about continued harvest restrictions into the future if the sum of impacts on listed fish was to avoid jeopardy.
This opinion was invalidated by a district court finding that the agency improperly
relied on assumed future actions that were not "reasonably certain to occur" (National Wildlife Federation v. NMFS 2003), leaving in question the ability of the
agencies to consider the "big picture" when section 7 biological opinions have implications for allocation of take.

Example 2: Considering Actions in Isolation
For many species it is the cumulative effect of many actions that have led to their
imperilment and it is difncult far the Services in a section 7 consultation to make
the case that a single small action, when added to the many other small actions,
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jeopardizes the species' continued existence. In the case of water withdrawals from
the Columbia River, NMFS did issue a jeopardy opinion to the Corps of Engineers
on the basis that Columbia River fl.ows were already below species' needs in many
years, the cumulative impact of withdrawals contributed to those low fl.ows, and
there was no mechanism in place to limit future withdrawals. Even though the
withdrawal under consideration was very small compared to overall fl.ows in the
Columbia, NMFS concluded the proposed action would jeopardize Columbia
River salmon and steelhead because of the cumulative effect of past and future withdrawals (NMFS 1998). This decision stirred considerable controversy in the Basin,
leading Washington's Department of Ecology to appeal to the NRC, asking the
NRC to review the science supporting fl.ow levels in the Columbia. Although the
question put to the panel was framed in terms of the incremental risk posed by a
very small incremental degradation in fl.ows, the panel resisted being drawn into answering the narrow question. In its preliminary findings, the panel appears to support the analysis that because fl.ows currendyare inadequate, even small increases in
water withdrawals will increase risk (National Research Council2004c).

Advancing the Rote ofScience
The agencies need to provide dear guidance regarding general standards for
jeopardy and adverse modification. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and National Marine Fisheries Service could also provide dearer guidance on individual species, for example on identifYing critically low population levels, viable
population levels, and allowable levels of take. Standards should allow for scientific information to be taken into account along with the policy considerations.
AB with all seetions of the act, a life-cyde framework for estimating the potential effects of an action on species status would appear to be the best way to
adequately address the question posed in seetion 7. Whether that life-cyde
framework is quantitative or qualitative is less important than adopting a lifecyde perspective. In general, because of the inherent scientific uncertainty in estimating the biological consequences of numerous, small-scale actions, section
7 consultations should be treated as experiments that are monitored and adjusted as needed over time (see box 10.1).

The Science Underlying Limitations on Private Actions
The Endangered Species Act prohibits any person from taking a member of a
listed species (sec. (a)(1)(B); box 10.1). Take is defined broadly to indude harm,
and harm can indude destruction of habitat to the extent it actually injures or
kills individual animals. Science comes into play when a party seeks an excep-
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rion ro the take prohibition under section 10 (habitat conservation plans, or
Hers) or section 4(d). Regardless of the legal avenue, the standard is similarthe proposed take cannot result in jeopardy to the species' continued existence
or the destruction or adverse modification of its habitat.

The Role o/Science in Agency Practice
The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and National Marine Fisheries Service face
the same challenges in permitting take that they face in consultations with federal agencies. However, consultations between federal agencies are relatively fluid
and can be reinitiated when circumstances change or new information becomes
available. Private parties, on the other hand, often seek a long-term commitment
from the two agencies. In an effort to encourage more landowners to protect endangered species, the USFWS and NMFS adopted a series of policies offering assurances that agreements with the federal government would be lasting, for example through the "No Surprises" rule (USFWS and NMFS 1998) and safe
harbor agreements (USFWS 1999f, 1999g, 2001, 2003h; Bean et al. 2001).

Advancing the Role o/Science
The opportunities for improving the use of science under sections 10 or 4(d)
are similar to those under section 7-that is, if the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and National Marine Fisheries Service encourage transparent evaluation of
the cumulative effects of actions, in light of the overall effect of other actions
throughout a species' life cycle, better decisions under these sections of the act
should result.
Under sections 7 and 10 (and also under section 4(f), recovery planning,
discussed below) three key ecological relationships must be established: (1)
landscape-level processes that drive environmental factors imperiling a species,
(2) relationships between critical environmental factors and species status, and
(3) effects of actions that can directly or indirectly affect species status. To establish these relationships with certainty will require years of scientific study.
Meanwhile, identifYing data or information critical to such estimates will improve current decision making (e.g., Burgman 2005). Scientifically designed
monitoring and adaptive management of habitat conservation plans is also desirable but currently absent from most (Kareiva et a1. 1998).

The Science Underlying Recovery Planning
The Endangered Species Act requires the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and
National Marine Fisheries Service to adopt recovery plans for listed species
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(table 10.1) but does not specify a time frame within which plans must be completed. A recovery plan is expected to describe the biological conditions necessary for recovery of the species, or the state under which the species can be
delisted. Recovery plans do not have any regulatory effect, but they can be used
to coordinate and guide the agencies' decision making in section 7 and 10 consultations or in issuing take permits across a species' range. The act has minimal
requirements for recovery plans: they must specify objective, measurable criteria
for delisting, specific actions that will achieve those objectives, and an estimate
of the time and cost involved in completing the actions.

The Role o/Science in Agency Practice
Science has a clear role in determining the objective, measurable criteria that
will lead to delisting. It should also be used to identify factors limiting recovery
and determine the biological consequences of site-specific management actions
aimed at recovering the species.
The National Marine Fisheries Service provides a general recovery planning
document that outlines principles for plan development and content (NMFS
1992). Subsequently, NMFS wrote a document providing additional guidance
on specific technical issues concerning recovery planning for the rwenty-six
listed ESUs of Pacific salmon (McElhany et al. 2000; Ruckelshaus et al. 2002b).
It addresses several fundamental questions, including (1) What was the historical population structure of an ESU? (2) What are the characteristics of a viable
population for each of the historically independent populations in an ESU? (3)
What are possible configurations (which might differ from historical conditions) of the spatial distribution, risk status, and diversity characteristics of populations across a viable ESU? and (4) What actions are needed for recovery of an
ESU? Answers to questions 2 and 3 provide viability criteria for populations
and ESUs, and analyses underlying question 4 allow for evaluation of alternative actions and their predicted effects on population and ESU status.
The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service approaches recovery planning differently
than the National Marine Fisheries Service. Rather than establishing speciesbased viability criteria and identifying which actions can achieve those criteria,
the USFWS focuses technical analyses in recovery planning on threats to species
viability and the actions needed to alleviate them. Most plans describe recovery
criteria in qualitative rather than quantitative terms, although listed species
whose recovery plans contained quantitative criteria were more likely to be improving (Gerber and Hatch 2002).
Because of the complexity of predicting cumulative effects of any recovery
actions, the National Marine Fisheries Service is incorporating scenario planning into its estimates of the likely effects of habitat, hatchery, and harvest man-
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agement actions on the population status of listed salmon (Ruckelshaus et al.
2002b). Land- and water-use scenarios are being elicited from watershed councils in addition to climate projections, providing greater confidence in the proposed recovery plan.

Advancing the Role ofScience
The science underpinning recovery plans and their implementation needs improvement (Clark et al. 2002). Given the current state of knowledge, science is
best used to evaluate the relative merits of alternative actions rather than to provide "the answer." Collaboration with policy and planning staff who will influence implementation of actions is important (Rinkevich and Leon 2000; Wondolleck and Yaffee 2000; Brick et al. 2001; Yaffee 2006). Given the uncertainty
of recovery efforts, management actions should be treated as experiments that
are monitored with vigilance (Boersma et al. 2001; Crouse et al. 2002).
The need for more basic natural history information for informing decisions
under the ESA cannot be overstated. What constitutes a reproductively isolated
group of individuals for a given species? In which habitats does a species occur
throughout its life cycle, and what are its survival rates in alLernative habitat
types? What is the relative reproductive success of pairings between alternative
life history types (table 10.I)?
Conservation scientists have called for greater attention to multispecies and
ecosystem effects in recovery plans (USFWS and NMFS 1994b; Miller 1996).
The potential importance of such community and ecosystem-level effects to
species recovery is great, as illustrated by north Pacific whaling effects on sea otters in Alaska (Springer et al. 2003), ecological functions provided by grizzly
bears (Pyare and Berger 2003), and predation by Caspian terns (Sterna caspia)
on juvenile salmon in the Columbia River (Roby et al. 2003). How to incorporate community- or ecosystem-level effects in a recovery plan is not clear, and
Clark et al. (2002) caution that multispecies plans may in fact reduce the focus
on individual species to the detriment of their conservation status.
Finally, clearer agency guidance on what constitutes "acceptable" risk would
improve recovery planning, as would clearer explanation of how uncertainty in
biological conclusions is accounted for in decisions and whether there are differences between jeopardy and recovery standards.

How Can Scientists Improve ESA implementation?
The contributions of academic and agency science to ESA implementation have
been unevenly distributed among topical areas. Quantitative analyses to identify units for conservation and to estimate species viability (or, conversely, risk
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of extinction) have received the lion's share of attention in the scientific litera_
ture (fig. 10.1). These methods are not without controversy but are relatively
well tested and many of their limitations have been discussed (Waples, this volurne; Boyce 1992; Akpkaya et al. 1999; Coulson et al. 2001; Brook et al. 2000,
2002; Ellner and Fieburg 2003). Unfortunately, due to a lack of data, such
quantitative approaches are useful for only a small fraction of rare, threatened ,
or endangered species.
The science of characterizing degrees of imperilment using qualitative approaches also has improved since 1973 (e.g., IUCN 1994; Ak«akaya et al. 2000;
NatureServe 2003), and greater attention to these methods would be helpful in
ESA decisions for a majority of rhe species considered (Keith et al. 2004; McCarthy er al. 2004).
Analytical methods to address the remaining questions asked in the ESA implementation process have barely emerged in the scientific literature (fig. 10.1).
In particular, the science underlying identification of the effects of actions on
species status lags far behind. Such analyses are needed to address questions under sections 7 and 10 (i.e., do these actions significantly reduce the species' like-

1.

2.

3.

4.

lM1at 18 a
"Iistable" species?

Wh at '18 Its
nsk of e>:linction?

'Mat 18 critieal habitat
for the liste d specle s?

Does the action 'jeopardize'

the species' existence?

40J , - - - - - - - - ,

30J

20J

10J

~

m· Si

'"

~

~

:;.'

Digird population

-

segment~

End€flgered Spedas M
E'y\)1 rii onari Iy signi ticant unit
ESUs

~

~

8

R

8
i'O

Population 'IoiabiUtyanaIY:9s
Population Yiabilityanalyses
lAebil'y.nalys'

~

81 8

:;.'

i'O

'"~ '"~ 8R
:;.'

Crmrel ha,itat*
Essential habitat *

8
~ §l R
'7

§1 :;.'~ Ei
i'O

Joopard* AND enda1gered 1iPe:des
Section 7 AND endangered

RiSk of extindion

Extinction ti sk

Figure IO.I. Articles that address scientific questions posed under the Endangered Species
act, published between 1980 and 2003 and appearing in the ISL Web ofScience's Science
Citation Index Expanded Database. Search terms pertaining to each seien ce question are
listed below each panel.

Chapter 10. Science and Implementation

125

liho od of survival and recovery?), section 4(b) (i.e., what habitat quantities and
qualities are necessary for the survival and recovery of the species?), and section
4(f) (i.e., what actions are sufficient to achieve species viability criteria?). The
needed research is challenging, time consuming, and difficult to generalize
across species and locations. Especially lacking are empirical or analytical studies of the effects of specific actions on particular life stages and population
dynamics.
Communication between scientists and decision makers is critical. Simple
in concept, interaction between the groups is complicated in practice by the different worlds they inhabit-scientists can say "I don't know" and acknowledge
that some scientific questions require years to answer, while decision makers
must act within the limited time frames mandated by the Endangered Species
Act, often on the basis of incomplete information. This can lead to frustration
on both sides. We believe that the effort to communicate is well worth the trials
involved (Ruckelshaus et al. 2002b). Previous studies have highlighted the need
for help from conservation scientists that allows decision makers to more effectively link basic biology or ecology to management decisions (Floyd 2001;
Clark et al. 2002). Approaches such as those developed under decision theory
(Clemen 1996; Burgman 2005) and multicriteria mapping (Arrow and Raynaud 1986; Bana e Costa 1990) are potentially useful, but we found no examples applying these tools in decision making under the Endangered Species Act.
Science can have a significant impact on decisions made under the ESA as
long as it isn't relied upon to be the sole arbiter in decisions (Doremus 1997; see
Yaffee 2006). Scientists need to clearly explain to decision makers how science
can (and cannot) inform their choices. Scientists and decision makers should be
willing to participate in public forums where data, analytical approaches, and
assumptions can be openly discussed. It is a rare manager of endangered species
who will communicate through forums to which scientists are accustomed,
such as the published literature (e.g., Rosenberg 2002). If scientists are free to
interact with policy- and decision makers in processes designed to encourage
open exchange, the result will be a clearer understanding of the need for an appropriate role of science in solving species protection challenges.
It is critical that discussions between scientists and policy makers and those
involving the public clearly state the scientific basis for a result and any additional policy determinations brought to bear in making a decision under the
act. To improve scientific credibility and agency decision making, scientists and
decision makers must clearly distinguish between facts and assumptions and
how each drives the results. If they fail to do so, laypersons will challenge the
facts, rather than question the assumptions.
Because the act poses biological questions that almost always must be answered with imperfect information, scientists should encourage implementation
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of alternative actions as experiments. Furthermore, carefully estimating what We
can learn from experiments before launching into controversial sets of actions is
well worth the effort (e.g., Paulsen and Hinrichsen 2002), as is carefully monitoring the results. In the end, to enhance protection of species under the Endangered Species Act, biologists must get involved. Such involvement is not without
potential costs (e.g., Halpern and Wilson 2003), but conducting sound research
is not enough to protect a species if the results from a beautiful biological study
sit in a journal, unread.
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